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Since its 2004 enlargement to the East, the European Union has faced major crises including the global financial crisis in 2008, the abrupt increase in 
the number of irregular migrant arrivals in 2015, 
and finally the coronavirus crisis in 2020. These 
crises have waged survival tests for political 
leaders. While many western democracies faced 
economic vulnerabilities, increasing populism, 
challenges to political systems, and see electoral 
defeat of incumbent leaders, the leaders of neo-
authoritarian states are looking for ways to 
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2011 have so far allowed Orbán to manipulate 
crises in a way to discursively present Hungary as 
a pillar of stability in Europe. This has served his 
claim for moral leadership even if morality and 
legitimacy of his executive role lack confluence. 
Orbán has also exploited public insecurities 
facing either increasing number of irregular 
migrant arrivals earlier or the coronavirus crisis 
recently to establish a knowledge-regime that 
require swift but authoritative executive action.
J o s e p h ’ s  ( 2 0 0 6 ,  1 3  i n  R e y e s  2 0 1 1 ,  7 8 4 ) 
elaboration on the persuasive nature of political 
discourse sheds light on the Hungarian context. 
Persuasive political discourse allows politicians 
to present their goals as their audiences’ goals 
while “the inspiring orator can lead a people, 
or rather mislead them, into believing that the 
narrow self-interests of the governing party 
are actually the interest of the people as a 
whole”. In this understanding, “the hierarchical 
assumption of leadership embodied in a single 
person at the apex of a unitary organization” 
is replaced by change agency for a broad range 
of collaborators and co-creates “a shared vision 
towards which they work” (Mabey and Freeman 
2010, 513). The coronavirus crisis provided Orbán 
with a chance to set the parameters of a shared 
vision to fight against the virus while presenting 
himself as the sole change agency to face the 
upcoming challenges. Discursively and amidst 
enfeebled accountability structures including the 
media, Orbán has assumed his crisis leadership 
once again.
 
Similar to the financial crisis (Korkut 2012) and 
during the time of the abrupt increase in the 
number of irregular migrant arrivals to Europe 
in 2015 (Gyollai 2018), during the coronavirus 
crisis as well Viktor Orbán sought to regulate the 
everyday narrative around the crisis situation. 
What is remarkable this time, however, was how 
his government received a rule by decree power 
from the Hungarian Parliament effectively 
indefinitely in March 20201 in order to enhance 
1　Német Tamás, Pintér Luca and Presinszky Judit, 
“Megszavazta az Országgyűlés a koronavírus-törvényt, 
Áder pedig ki is hirdette”, Index, 30 March 2020, available 
at: https://index.hu/belfold/2020/03/30/koronavirus-tor-
weather the crises by bolstering their leadership. 
As an example, the sudden increase in the 
number of irregular migrant arrivals to Europe 
in 2015 made extreme right politicians such 
as Salvini in Italy and Le Pen in France central 
actors of European politics while it challenged 
the leadership of Angela Merkel in Germany. 
Finally, the coronavirus pandemic and the health 
and economic crisis hitting Europe is posing 
increased challenges to almost all incumbent 
political leaders. 
It is interesting to draw parallels between 
the three crises, i.e., financial, migration, and 
coronavirus, that hit the EU, and Viktor Orbán’s 
ascendance to power and entrenching his total 
control of Hungary. There seems a pattern 
as to how Orbán carved a leadership role for 
him by appealing to public insecurities that 
such crises have fostered amongst the general 
population. This short article follows this pattern 
to understand how leaders can manipulate 
particular crisis contexts to consolidate their 
leadership via both formal institutions and 
strategic discourses, and entice the public 
opinion to their support amidst crises. To this 
extent, it reflects on the coronavirus crisis but 
takes into consideration the institutional and 
discursive construction of leadership amidst 
crises. The article investigates how leaders 
stimulate the processes by which their followers’ 
understanding of the world is produced (van 
Leuuwen 2007, 95) during crises. The theoretical 
foundation of the article relies on leaders’ 
social knowledge production, legitimation, and 
inculcation of such knowledge among their 
followers (van Leuuwen 2007; Reyes 2011) to 
foster collective rationality. 
The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has 
carved out his leadership since 2010 amidst three 
crises at the detriment of democracy in Hungary. 
In response to the coronavirus crisis as well, 
Orbán pursued a self-made moral leadership 
to manage crisis governance. The enfeebled 
institutional accountability due to weakened 
judiciary and parliamentary oversight due to the 
earlier constitutional changes in Hungary after 
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Orbán’s crisis leadership. Given the two-thirds 
control over the Parliament by Fidesz and the 
dominance of Fidesz-appointed judges at the 
Constitutional Court, basically the legislation 
delivered the country to Orbán fully without 
any checks and balances. In order to guarantee 
continuity of control in the Parliament, the 
Fidesz also introduced a clause that whilst the 
crisis situation continues there can be no by-
election or referendum2. This was an attempt 
to hinder the Hungarian opposition from any 
attempts to tarnish the parliamentary control 
of the Fidesz government and won against 
the government thanks to building electoral 
alliances3.
veny_koronavirus_szavazas_parlament/
2　F á b i á n  Ta m á s ,  “ T i s z t á z u n k  m i n d e n t  a  k o r o -
navírus-törvényről”, Index, 23 March 2020, available at: 
https://index.hu/belfold/2020/03/23/koronavirus_felhatal-
mazasi_torveny_szajbarago/
3　Umut Korkut, “The new mayor of Budapest has shown 
us how to defeat authoritarian populists like Viktor Or-
ban”, Independent, 14 October 2019, available at: https://
www.independent.co.uk/voices/populism-brexit-or-
ban-hungary-budapest-mayor-boris-johnson-a9155226.
html
After two months of emergency rule, Orbán 
signalled that he is now ready to relinquish his 
extraordinary powers at the end of May 2020, 
and his government is looking to shift from 
“crisis governance” to play “a modest role 
in pandemic preparedness” according to the 
government spokesperson Gergely Gulyás4. 
There are some, who may consider this a sign 
of well-functioning democracy in Hungary5. 
However, if we approach his crisis governance 
amidst the pandemic and particularly his 
discursive style, we can grasp the legacy of 
the rule by decree will leave in Hungary. The 
discursive construction of his crisis government 
involved anti-western discourses with praises 
of technocratic governance at the expense 
of democratic accountability structures. It is 
4　Biró Marianna and Presinszky Judit, “Gulyás Gergely: 
Szerény jogkörei maradnak a kormánynak a járványügyi 
készültség idején”, Index, 28 May 2020, available at: 
https://index.hu/belfold/2020/05/28/kormanyinfo_frissulo_
osszefoglalo_csutortok_koronavirus_veszelyhelyzet/
5　Andreas Stefanovszky, “Letter: In defence of Orban’s 
pandemic policies”, Financial Times, 20 May 2020, available 
at: https://www.ft.com/content/6f91af5e-f963-46c1-b0b2-
12f0818675cf
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán met with Charles Michel, President of the European Council (Source: 
Council of the European Union)
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important to note that even when the rule by 
decree is annulled, these two discursively and 
institutionally ordered governance mechanisms 
w i l l  r e m a i n  l a t e n t  i n  H u n g a r i a n  p u b l i c 
philosophy.
 
The rule by decree received in March 2020 
showed Orbán’s pragmatism and how his party 
could exploit the health panic in the country 
at the face of the coronavirus crisis. It also 
presented him with a chance to regain his party’s 
c o n t r o l  o v e r  p o l i t i c s 
in the aftermath of its 
relative weakening at 
the 2019 local election6. 
F inal ly ,  an important 
point to make is that how 
a political machine such 
as Fidesz that has always 
claimed legitimacy by 
popular election and its 
capacity to represent the 
Hungarian nation thanks 
to two-thirds majority 
has exploited crises to 
entrench an executive 
rule for the PM. Orbán 
f o l l o w e d  a  s i m i l a r 
strategy during the self-
declared “refugee crisis” 
as well when faced with 
t h e  s u d d e n  i n c r e a s e 
in the number of irregular migrant arrivals to 
Europe in 2015. The Hungarian government 
then declared a “state of crisis due to mass 
migration” giving unfettered powers to the army 
and the police to quash any unrest7. This self-
defined extraordinary situation enhanced the 
government’s sway later over the third sector 
organisations active in migrant integration field 
and controlled everyday narrative sometimes by 
6　h t t p s : / / w w w . g o o g l e . c o m / s e a r c h ? c l i e n t = s a -
f a r i & r l s = e n & q = 2 0 1 9 + h u n g a r i a n + l o c a l + e l e c -
tions&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8
7　Daniel Gyollai, “Hungary – Country Report Legal & Poli-
cy Framework of Migration Governance”, Working Papers 
– Global Migration: Consequences and Responses, May 
2018, available at: http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/
diva2:1248319/FULLTEXT01.pdf
circulating its own fake news8. One more thing 
to note is that the Hungarian legislation used 
the term of “state of emergency”9. Recently, 
the Czech Republic as well turned to state of 
emergency top face the coronavirus crisis10. 
Yet, the Hungarian decree came with severe 
punishment clauses. Under its provisions, 
intentionally spreading false information 
about the virus will be punishable by a prison 
sentence of up to five years11. The Hungarian 
false information clause remained very vague 
suggesting punishing 
rumour and alarming 
news, and also raising 
questions regarding what 
happens to those that 
share these “rumours”. 
In fact, two people were 
taken into custody for 
ra is ing rumours  with 
their Facebook posts12.
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e 
d i s c o u r s e  a r o u n d 
t h e  H u n g a r i a n  c r i s i s 
g o v e r n a n c e  f a c i n g 
t h e  c o r o n a v i r u s  w a s 
embellished with anti-
western tones. At the 
o u t s e t  o f  t h e  c r i s i s , 
Orbán stated that the 
coronavirus crisis has 
8　Umut Korkut, “Hungary sanctions: don’t expect Viktor 
Orbán to back down after parliament vote”, The Conversa-
tion, 13 September 2018, available at: https://theconversa-
tion.com/hungary-sanctions-dont-expect-viktor-orban-to-
back-down-after-parliament-vote-103128
9　Supra note 2
10　“3 ülkede daha koronavirüs nedeniyle olağanüstü hal 
ilan edildi”, Anadolu Agency, 16 March 2020, available at 
https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/3-ulkede-daha-koronavi-
rus-nedeniyle-olaganustu-hal-ilan-edildi/1767279
11　Valerie Hopkins, “Orban handed power to rule by de-
cree in Hungary”, Financial Times, 30 March 2020, available 
at: https://www.ft.com/content/4dc85972-e917-4c8d-9db1-
8e72400b9e8a
12　Pálfi Rita, “Már két embert is elvittek a rendőrök 
Facebook-poszt miatt a rémhírterjesztési törvényre hi-
vatkozva”, Euronews, 14 May 2020, available at: https://
hu.euronews.com/2020/05/13/mar-ket-embert-is-elvittek-
a-rendorok-facebook-poszt-miatt-a-remhirterjesztesi-tor-
venyre-h
The enfeebled institutional 
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  d u e  t o 
weakened judiciary and 
parliamentary oversight 
d u e  t o  t h e  e a r l i e r 
constitutional changes in 
Hungary after 2011 have 
so far allowed Orbán to 
manipulate crises in a way 
to discursively  present 
H u n g a r y  a s  a  p i l l a r  o f 
stability in Europe.
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exposed the EU’s “weaknesses” and failure 
to help in times of need13 and justified his anti-
western tone with a trope that “help does 
not really come from here”. Alleging the EU’s 
institutional structures with deficiencies in 
responding to the crisis, he continued “there are 
times when you can’t be polite” and “he made 
it clear to EU “squeakers” that now is not the 
time to “reason” with legal, theoretical issues 
because there is an epidemic, lives need to be 
saved”. He continued to say that “the high-
salaried EU epidemiology office staff” i.e., the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention, failed 
in January and February months to prevent 
the pandemic in Europe14. Instead, Orbán 
chose to endorse the Chinese credentials of 
the fight against the coronavirus. Him and the 
Chinese Ambassador to Budapest met a Chinese 
plane with medical supplies at the Budapest 
Airport earlier in the crisis while the Hungarian 
media provided the images of Orbán and the 
Ambassador of China meeting each other with 
elbow greetings to emphasise the conviviality 
between the two regimes15.
13　Lili Bayer, “Viktor Orbán criticizes EU’s coronavirus cri-
sis response”, Politico, 27 March 2020, available at: https://
www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-viktor-orban-criticiz-
es-eu-crisis-response/
14　“Szombattól érvényes kijárási korlátozást vezet be a 
kormány”, hirado.hu, 27 March 2020, available at: https://
hirado.hu/belfold/kozelet/cikk/2020/03/27/kijarasi-korla-
tozast-vezet-be-a-kormany
15　“Videóból derült ki: fontos döntéseket hoz Orbán Vik-
tor és az akciócsoportok”, Portfolio, 25 March 2020, avail-
To coclude the Hungarian case shows how 
amidst the crisis, rather than ensuring the 
accountability of their decisions, governments 
can exclude parliamentary control over their 
course of action. In fact, this exclusion imbued 
with anti-western discourses in the case of 
Hungary aimed to demote an accountability-
oriented response style to the pandemic in 
order to promote technocratic governance as 
the most effective means. This is the reason why 
while Orbán may now be relinquishing the rule 
by decree the legacy of his response will remain 
and qualify how governments can fight crises 
“successfully”. 
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